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The relationship between the financial and real sides of the economy has long been a
topic of intense interest and debate.  The potential importance of the financial sector
in promoting economic growth was recognized as early as Schumpeter (1912), though
this perspective was disputed by numerous economists over the decades that  followed
(most notably by Lucas (1988)). Proper empirical work in assessing the relationship
between financial development and  the real economy began only much later,  with
the work of King and  Levine (1993a,b) who reported cross-country evidence which
suggested that  financial development affects economic growth by fostering produc-
tivity  improvements. Since then, there has developed a large and growing literature
that  examines the  relationship between financial market  development and  various
economic outcomes, primarily utilizing the cross-country data and methodology pio-
neered by LLSV'(1997, 1998, 2000). LLSV argue that  the development of financial
markets depends on a country's legal origin, which is largely exogenous to the coun-
try's future economic growth. 2 However,  this body of work is based almost entirelyon
cross-country analyses which always raises serious concerns about unobserved hetero-
geneity across data points.  Furthermore, these country-level studies cannot properly
examine the channels through which finance affects growth, as this requires the micro-
level analysis of firm behavior.
The micro-level examination of the link between real and financial decisions of
firms has seen considerable work since the pioneering contribution of Modigliani and
Miller (1958), who showed that  in a world of perfect capital markets, finance is irrele-
vant for real decisions. This view has been amended and disputed by richer theoretical
models, and empirical studies that  have found a strong  relationship between firms'
financial health  and  investment  (see Hubbard  (1998) for a recent  survey).  These
'Rafael La Porta, Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Andrey Shleifer,  and Robert Vishny
2See Levine  and Zervos  (1998),  Levine (1999) and Beck, Levine and Loyaza.(2000)  for recent
cross-country  studies.  Several  recent studies use time-series  analysis, for example, Neusser and
Kugler  (1998)  and Rousseau  and Wachtel  (1998) address  the causality issues,  and Bekaert,  Harvey
and Lundblad  (2000)  look at the effect  of financial  liberalization  on growth.
2financing constraints are generally attributed  to capital market imperfections, stem-
ming from such factors as asymmetric information and incentive problems, which
result in differences between the costs of internal and external financing.
The results contained in this paper lie at the intersection of these two broad liter-
atures.  Utilizing firm-level  data, while taking advantage of cross-country variation in
financial market development, I show that  financing constraints, measured by the sen-
sitivity of investment to  internal funds, decrease with financial development. These
findings are robust to a wide variety of specifications, and to the consideration of a
range of alternative  explanations.  I also report  a number of ancillary results that
provide further evidence on the importance of financial market development for firm
investment. In particular, I find that  small firms are disproportionately more disad-
vantaged in less financially developed countries than are large firms, i.e.  they have
relatively larger sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds. Together,
these results provide a micro-level foundation for one of the commonly cited explana-
tions for the observed cross-country relationship between financial development and
economic growth. Namely, I provide evidence that  an improvement in the function-
ing of financial markets will reduce firms' financing constraints.  This will allow for
easier access to external funds for firms with good investment opportunities  and this
improvement in capital allocation will in turn enhance growth.
The methodology used in this paper is based on the established literature  on in-
vestment with financing constraints, which began with the work of Fazzari, Hubbard
and Peterson (1988). The first papers in this field, based on the Q-theory of invest-
ment, were based upon models that  contained a number of very strong assumptions,
such as constant returns  to scale, perfect competition, and perfect capital markets.
The assumption of perfect capital markets is particularly problematic for my paper,
as I explicitly assume that  capital markets of the countries in my sample are at dif-
ferent levels of development, and therefore cannot be considered "perfect."  I adopt
the Euler equation methodology, utilized by more recent contributions to the financ-
ing constraints literature,  which has less restrictive assumptions than  the previous
3generation of models, including a relaxation of the perfect capital markets assump-
tion.3 The advantage of using the Euler equation methodology is that  it explicitly
controls for growth opportunities  captured  by the marginal product  of capital.  In
this framework, the sensitivity of investment to the level of internal funds is inter-
preted as evidence of financing constraints.  This sensitivity is allowed to vary with
the country-specific level of financial development using the interaction of the finan-
cial development index and a firm-level  measure of internal funds. This interaction is
shown to be significantly negative, which implies that  financial development reduces
financing constraints.
This paper builds upon several recent studies that  similarly address issues on the
role of the financial system in stimulating economic growth using micro-data.  The
work that  is closest in spirit and methodology to that  of my paper is Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998), which is the only other firm-level study  that  examines the
link between financial development and growth. In their paper, the authors first cal-
culate the proportion of firms in a country that  were growing faster than they could
have using only internally generated funds.  They find that  this  proportion is posi-
tively related to financial development and to legal system indicators. Although this
finding clearly suggests that  more developed financial markets improve the availabil-
ity of external finance in the aggregate, it does not  have any bearing on the issue
of allocation of capital within a country, as this would require identifying firms that
"should" be growing, given their investment opportunities.  I am able to address this
issue by using a structural  model which explicitly controls for growth opportunities
at the firm level.
3Euler equations  for Investment have been estimated by numerous  authors, with most studies
concentrating  on US firms. See Whited (1992),  Hubbard and Kashyap (1992),  Hubbard, Kashyap
and Whited (1995),  and Calomiris  and Hubbard (1995)  among others. The limited work  utilizing
international  data includes  Bond and Meghir  (1994)  for the UK; Jaramilo  et al. (1996)  for Ecuador;
Harris, Schiantarelli,  and Siregar  (1994)  for  Indonesia;  and Gelos  and Werner  (1999)  for Mexico.  The
only  paper that estimated the Euler equation for several  countries  is by Bond et al. (1996),  which
includes  observations  from Belgium,  FRance,  Germany  and the UK. A related paper by Kadapakkam
et al.  (1998)  studied investment  in six developed  countries. They used a reduced form approach
combining  Q-theory  and sales "accelerator"  together with cash flow  and cash stock measures.  Also,
they did not compare  financing  constraints  across  countries.
4Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998) use  industry  level data  to  show that  industries  that
require  more  external  finance  grow faster  in more  developed  capital  markets.  Thus,
they  claim  that  financial  development  affects growth  by reducing  the  differential  cost
of  external  finance.  While  their  work  is  very  innovative  and  yields  a  number  of
interesting  findings,  it is based  on several strong  assumptions.  One particularly  strong
assumption  that  is implicit  in their  analyses is that  growth opportunities  are the  same
for a given industry  in all countries.  That  is, if an industry  is not growing at the  same
rate  as it is in other  countries,  it is a failure  of the  financial  markets.  In other  words,
the  authors  do not  attempt  to control  for the growth  opportunities  available  for each
industry  at  every  point  of time  in  each  country.  Again,  the  structural  approach
adopted  here  allows me to  address  this  issue and  to explicitly  control for such growth
opportunities.
Finally,  Wurgler  (2000) finds that  financial  development  improves  capital  alloca-
tion  by  increasing  the  industry-level  sensitivity  of investment  growth  to  value  added
growth.  Wurgler  points  out two reasons  why firms in less developed  financial markets
might  not  undertake  the  most  profitable  projects  (and  thus  worsen  capital  alloca-
tion).  First,  insiders  might  not  be able to  distinguish  good  investment  opportunities
due  to  the  lack of information.  In support  of this  proposition,  he finds  that  more
firm-specific  information  in  returns  increases  the  sensitivity  of investment  to  value
added  growth.  Second,  insiders  might  not  have  incentives  to  undertake  the  most
profitable  investments  if their  profits  are  expropriated;  he provides  evidence  for this
hypothesis  by  showing that  state  ownership  is associated  with  lower sensitivity  and
minority  rights  with  higher  sensitivity.
Although  my study  is  in  a  similar  spirit  to  these  previous  papers,  it  improves
upon  them  in a  number  of ways.  As noted  above,  since  I use  structural  model,  in
the  form of investment  Euler  equations,  I am able to control  for future  growth  oppor-
tunities  by  explicitly  including  the  marginal  productivity  of investment  (a measure
of growth  opportunities).  Also, the  model  identifies  the  information  set  available  at
each decision-making  point,  which allows for the specification  of a valid instrument  set
5and the use of an appropriate estimation technique. In addition, the model allows for
the interpretation  of estimated coefficients as structural  parameters, which provides
an  additional check on the plausibility of my results.  iurthermore, by using firm-
level data,  rather than  industry-level aggregates, I exploit firm heterogeneity in the
productivity of capital. Since some firms will be more productive than others within
the same industry, allocating capital to the industry as a whole is not as efficient as
allocating capital to the most productive firms within each industry.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the structural  investment
model based on a dynamic optimization problem and discusses  financing constraints.
Section 3 discusses the  empirical model and estimation  methodology, and  Section
4 describes the data.  Section 5 provides the main results including the analysis of
structural  parameters.  Section 6 presents several tests  of alternative  explanations,
including the size effect, business cycles and legal system. Section 7 presents the aux-
iliary results using single-country regressions. Finally, Section 8 provides conclusions
and directions for future research.
2  The  Model  of Investment
2.1  The  Optimization  Problem
The dynamic model of the firm value optimization is reproduced in this section. This
model is similar to models used in previous studies (listed in footnote 3), and follows
closely the specification in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). The model is simplified
here because it ignores the possibility of debt financing. However, this simplification
does not affect the resulting first order conditions for investment, which are the focus
of this paper.4 In this model shareholders (or managers) are maximizing the present
value of the firm, which is equal to the expected discounted value of dividends subject
'Formally including  debt  into the problem results in a separate Euler equation for debt, see
Gilchrist  and Himmelberg  (1998) for derivation. However,  the investment Euler equation is not
directly  related to the debt Euler equation and is not affected  by adding debt into the model.
6to the capital  accumulation  and external  financing  constraints.  The firm value is given
by:
Vt(Kt, (t)  max  Dt + Et  Ot+s-Dt+s  (1)
subject  to
Dt=  Il(Kt,  t)  - C(It,  Kt)  - It  (2)
Kt+1 =  (I1- 6)Kt  +.It  (3)
Dt >  °  (4)
Here Dt is the  dividend  paid  to shareholders  and  is given by the  "sources equal  uses"
constraint  (2); Ot+,-,,  is a  discount  factor  from  the  period  t + s to period  t.  In the
capital  accumulation  constraint  (3)  Kt  is the  beginning  of the  period  capital  stock,
It is the  investment  expenditure  and  6 is the  depreciation  rate.  The  restricted  profit
function  (i.e.  it  is already  maximized  with  respect  to  variable  costs)  is denoted  by
[I(Kt, (4),  where  (t  is a  productivity  shock.5 The  adjustment  cost  of investment  is
given  by  the  function  C(It,  Kt),  and  is assumed  to  result  in  a  loss of a  portion  of
investment.  The  financial  frictions  are  introduced  via  a  non-negativity  constraint
on  dividends  (4),  and  the  multiplier  on  this  constraint  is denoted  At  below.  This
multiplier  equals to the  shadow  cost associated  with  raising  new equity, which  implies
that  external  (equity)  financing  is costly  and  this  extra  cost  is due  to information  or
'The  profit function depends on the beginning  of the period capital, and hence the implicit
assumption  is that investment  becomes  productive  only in the next period (i.e., a one period time
to build lag).  I ignore the price of invesment  which is replaced by fixed and time effects  in the
estimation. I also ignore  tax considerations  due to data constraints.
7contracting costs. 6 This shadow cost is used in defining financing constraints, which
are discussed below.
2.2  The  Euler  Equation
The Euler equation derived from the above maximization problem (derivations are
available from the author) is given by:
1±  (00)  =tEt[et  {(t  (  +(1-  ) (  (  )+)  (5)
Here, a9C  is the marginal adjustment  cost of investment, '9,1  is the marginal "profit"
of capital, further referred as MPK, (the contribution of an extra unit of capital to
the firm's profits), and et  =  (t+i  is the relative shadow  cost of external finance
in periods  t and t + 1. I refer  to the factor et as "financing  constraints"  and discuss
it in a separate  section below. The intuition behind this Euler equation  is that the
marginal  cost of investing  today on the left hand side (given  by the adjustment cost
and the price of investment goods, normalized  to one) is equal to the discounted
marginal  cost of postponing  investment  until tomorrow,  on the right hand side. The
latter is equal to the sum of the foregone  marginal benefit  of an extra unit in capital,
given by MPK, plus the adjustment cost and price of investment  tomorrow (again
normalized  to one).
To arrive  at the empirical  model,  one must identify  empirical  measures  for financ-
ing constraints  and MPK,  specify  a functional  form  for adjustment  costs,  linearize  the
Euler equation  and eliminate  the expectation  operator. These issues  are addressed  in
the subsections  below.
'Several influential  papers addressed the sources  of information-  or contracting-related  frictions
in detail. See,  for example,  Jensen and Meckling  (1976),  Myers  and Majluf (1984),  Hart (1995)  and
others. Here, these frictions  are exogenous  to the firm and are represented  by the shadow  value  of
external finance.  Another  possible  way to introduce  financial  frictions  is by exogenously  limiting  the
amount of debt that the firm can raise at any point in time. This will  create a shadow  value  of debt,
which  has the same effect  in the Euler equation  as the shadow  value  of equity.
82.3  Financing  Constraints
At  the  heart  of the  financing  constraints  theory  is the  factor  et =-(t+i  which
is the  relative  shadow  cost  of external  finance  in periods  t and  t +  1.  If the  shadow
cost  of external  funds  is higher  in  period  t than  it is expected  to  be  in period  t + 1
(i.e.  At >  At+,), then  Ot  <  1 and  it acts as an additional  discount  factor  which  makes
current  period  funds  more expensive  to  use than  the  next  period  funds  and  therefore
induces  the  firm  to  postpone  or reduce  its  investment.  In this  case  we say  that  the
firm  is "financially  constrained,"  and  et  is the  (degree  of)  financing  constraints. 7 In
perfect  capital  markets  At =  At+,  =  0  for  all t  and  hence  Ot  =  1 and  the  firm  is
never  constrained.  With  capital-markets  imperfections,  At depends  on  a  vector  of
state  variables,  including  the  productivity  shock  't.  Therefore,  At is time-varying  and
could be identified  with  some observable  firm characteristics.
In the previous  work several observable characteristics  of the  firm's financial  health
have  been  used  as proxies  for  the  financing  constraints.  The  most  commonly  used
variable  was the  cash  flow.  The  problem  with  cash  flow is that  it is closely related
to operating  profits  and  therefore  also to  MPK  and  will measure  investment  oppor-
tunities  rather  than,  or  in  addition  to,  measuring  the  availability  of internal  funds
(i.e.  the  net  worth).  Using  the  terminology  in  Gilchrist  and  Himmelberg  (1998) it
could be  argued  that  the  change  in  cash  flow would  simultaneously  reflect  a change
in  "fundamentals"  (increase  in  marginal  productivity)  and  "financials"  (increase  in
the  net  worth  of the  firm,  which will relax  financing  constraints).
As a  measure  of the  internal  funds,  I  use the  stock  of liquid  assets,  specifically
stock of cash and  marketable  securities  scaled  by total  assets  (hereafter  referred  to as
Cash  Stock).  The  cash  stock  has  an  intuitive  interpretation  as  "cash  on  hand"  that
7If, on the other side, et >  1, the firm expects to be more constrained  tomorrow (time t+1)
than it is today and at time t its investment  will be unconstrained. In this case the firm is more
likely  to invest at time t, since  the discount factor  ,3 is increased  by the amount Ot  (i.e. the interest
rate is lowered).  Another possibility is that  et =  1, because At  =  At+,  # 0.  But  this  seems very
unlikely in a stochastic  model since At depends on a realization  of the  productivity  shock.  Even if
it is possible for some firms in some years to  have Ot  =  1, in estimating  country-wide  constraints
such a situation  is very unlikely.
9firms can use for investment if the opportunities arrive. One theoretical justification
for the cash stock measure appears in the Myers and Majluf (1984) model, where the
amount of cash holdings, which the authors call "financial slack," has a direct effect
on investment in the presence of asymmetric information.  This slack allows firms
to undertake positive NPV projects, which they would pass if they do not have any
internal funds. This implies that if external financing is costly, there will be a positive
relationship between investment and cash stock, this is the relationship explored in
this paper.
Unlike the cash flow measure, the cash stock would proxy for the future growth
opportunities only in the presence of financing constraints. That is, firms that expect
high  investment in the  future,  would accumulate  cash stock  to  use up when the
opportunities  arrive.  Since holding cash is costly to  the  firms (because it diverts
resources from the productive use and offers zero return),  the firms will accumulate
cash stock only if they expect to be financially constrained in the future. The evidence
consistent with this hypothesis is presented in Opler et al.  (1999), among others. 8
They find that  firms hold liquid assets to ensure that  they can keep investing when
outside funds are expensive and the firms that  have lower cost of external financing
(large, dividend-paying, and firms with credit ratings) hold smaller stocks of liquid
assets.
I assume that  the firm makes its decision for period t investment at the beginning
of that  year (or, equivalently, the end of previous year). Therefore the appropriate
timing of the cash stock is t - 1, because the investment decision depends on how
much cash a firm has before starting  the investment.  I parametrize the financing
8Kim et al. (1998),  Calomiris,  Himmelberg  and Wachtel  (1995)  and Calomiris  and Himmelberg
(1996)  also  find  that firms  with lower  costs  of external finance  maintain  lower  levels  of financial  work-
ing capital. Despite  the growing  empirical  evidence  on the "precautionary  savings"  by financially
constrained  firms, this hypothesis  still remains controversial,  see for example Kaplan and Zingales
(1997); their view is disputed  in Fazzari, Hubbard  and Petersen  (2000).
10constraints as a function of cash stock as
Eit  =  aOi  + aCashit-1,
where aoi is a firm-specific  level of financing constraints (which enters into the fixed
effects) and  Cashit-, is the  cash stock. The sensitivity of investment to  financial
health, measured by the parameter a, is the main focus of this paper. Recall from the
discussion above that  under perfect capital markets, Eit =  1, hence a = 0 (i.e. invest-
ment is not related to internal funds).  The larger the capital market imperfections,
the larger will be the sensitivity of investment to the amount of internal funds.
The main argument of this paper is that  if financial development decreases capital
market imperfections, it should also decrease the coefficient  a. In other words, the co-
efficient a is allowed to depend on the country-level measure of financial development
(hereafter FD), given by:
Oit = aoi + (a, + a2FD,)Cashjtij.  (6)
Thus, the focus is on the  interaction of FD and  Cash, i.e.  coefficient a2, and  it is
expected to  be negative, which will imply that  financial development reduces the
sensitivity of investment to internal funds (i.e. financing constraints).9
2.4  Measuring  MPK
The measure of MPK, derived from the profit maximization problem (derivations
are available from the author), is given by
MPK  = 0K  (7)
9In section  6.4 I present auxiliary  results which  allow  for country-specific  coefficients  a,.
11where  s  is a  sales to  capital ratio,  0 =  ,  ak  is the  capital share in the produc-
tion function and  ,L  is a markup." 0 This is a sales-based measure.  An alternative
measure, which has been used in previous work (also derived in Appendix 2) is an
operating-profits measure.  Although both  measures are based on strong assump-
tions,"  the sales-based measure is less correlated with cash flow than the operating
profits measure (which basically is equal to cash flow). As discussed above, cash flow
would simultaneously proxy for change in "fundamentals" and "financials," therefore
I prefer to use the sales-based measure. As discussed in the previous section, I assume
that  the firm makes the period t investment decision at the end of the period t - 1.
Therefore the appropriate timing for the sales to capital ratio is the end of period t.
2.5  Adjustment  Costs
The adjustment  cost function  is given  by C(It, Kt) =  t2  - 9Kt  V 1 )2Kt.  This
adjustment cost function is slightly more general than the one used in the traditional
models because it includes lagged investment to capital ratio with an additional pa-
rameter g.  It is added to capture  strong persistence in investment to capital ratios
present in the data.  This extended functional form allows for the more common form
with g =  0, which could be tested empirically. The intuition for this added term is
that  it may be easier for the firm to continue investment at some fraction g of the
previous period ratio, since, for example, it has hired workers or made some other
arrangements which would be costly to cancel. Parameter vi could be interpreted as
some firm-specific  level of investment at which adjustment costs are minimized. The
'0In the definition  used here, the parameter ak  (the capital share) is likely  to be industry-specific,
and a markup (the measure  of the market  power) will be either industry or firm-specific.  However
in the empirical  work, the coefficient  on sales to capital is assumed  to be constant across  all firms.
This will cause a measurement  error, which  is likely to bias the coefficient  on the sales to capital
toward zero. This problem is ameliorated with the fixed effects, which capture the firm-specific  level
of sales to capital.
"The  operating-profits measure assumes that  there are no fixed costs (i.e., reported Cost of Goods
Sold reflects only variable costs) and  no quasi-fixed factors of production  (such as R&D capital or
intangible assets). The sales-based measure assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function; while this
is a questionable assumption,  the  sales-based measure allows for quasi-fixed factors of production
and fixed costs.
12marginal adjustment cost of investment is given by:
=  av)(8)
AI  t  (Kt  9Kt_li)
2.6  Linearization  and  Expectations
Although the stochastic  discount factor  introduced by financing constraints,  Ot
enters the Euler equation in a multiplicative form, in empirical work it is often easier
to estimate and interpret financing constraints when they enter additively. Similarly,
it is convenient to separate the discount factor ft in a linear term to allow for country-
and  time-specific discount factors.  Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), I
linearize the product of ft, Ot  and the marginal benefit of investment (expression in
curly brackets in (5), here denoted as {'.t)  using a first-order Taylor approximation
around the means. Since Ot  could be above or below one, its mean should be a value
around one.  Denoting the unconditional mean of the expression in  curly brackets
as -y,  and the average discount factor as 13,  the approximation is given by (ignoring
constant terms):12
Otot {'t  = Thet  +  I-  {}t  + ,yt-  (9)
Finally, I assume rational expectations, which allows me to replace expectations
with realized values plus an expectation error eit. The error term is orthogonal to any
information available at the time when the  investment decision is made.  I assume
that  the investment decision for year t  is made at the beginning of that  year (which
is equivalent to end of year t - 1). Therefore, the information available at the time of
decision is dated t - 1 since year t information does not arrive until the end of year
t.  Then, the orthogonality conditions for this model are given by E[etIxt.8I  =  0 for
s  )  1. This is equivalent to the assumption that  the regressors are predetermined,
12Note  that I implicitly  assume  that the covariance  between  the financing  constraints  factor  and the
marginal  benefit  of investment  (the term in {.}) is constant (in the empirical  model  this covariance
is captured by country-time  dummies and fixed  effects).
13rather  then strictly  exogenous, and  therefore require special estimation techniques
discussed in section 3.1.
3  Empirical  Model  and  Estimation
I obtain the empirical model by substituting  (6),  (7), (8), and  (9) into (5), and
replacing the expectation with the realization plus an error term.  It is given by:
I  =  I  +  2  I  +  13 K  + i 4Cashit-1  + 03 5Cashi,t-IFD, + fi + d,,t  + eit,
Kit  K i t+1  Sit-l  it
(10)
where the coefficients  are related to the structural  parameters as:
01 =  u  2  =  d  =  4 =  a,  -.  a2 and d = 1 +  (1-6)g. d  2 d  3 ad'  4 d  ad
(11)
Here, fi denotes fixed effects, 13 and d,,t denotes country-time dummies, that  capture
aggregate shocks, including productivity,  prices, and  other macro shocks that  are
allowed to be different for each country.
With respect to the coefficients  in equation (10), the main hypothesis of this paper
is formally stated  as:
Ho:  34)0and3 5 < 0.  (12)
That  is,  financing constraints  are nonzero (for at  least  some countries)  and  they
decrease with financial development.  (Note that  /4  and  15 depend on previously
13Fixed effects arise  in this  structural  model  for several reasons.  First,  there  are  firm-specific
parameters  for adjustment  cost  vi  and  for financing constraints  aoi.  Second, the  omitted  terms
that  contain prices of investment goods and  the conditional covariance of financing constraints  and
marginal benefit of investment  (discussed in 2.6) are replaced by the combination of time and  fixed
effects. Third, the  fixed effects capture  a sample selection bias if the firms included in the sample
have different investment policy than  the rest.
14defined  structural  parameters  a,  and  a2.)  The  focus  is on  the  interaction  of Cashit
(the  firm-level  variable  measure  of internal  funds)  and  FD,  (the  country-level  index
of financial  development).
Hereafter,  I refer to  equation  (10) as the  "baseline  model."  I use the  same frame-
work to test  whether  other  measures  affect financing  constraints  by replacing  FD with
the index of interest  (for example  legal system  indicators).  For robustness  tests,  I add
additional  interactions  to  the baseline  model to see if the financial  development  effect
is still present  when I control  for other  potential  sources  of financing  constraints  (such
as firm  size or business  cycles, described  in section  6).
3.1  Estimation  Methodology
The first issue in estimating  this  model concerns the  presence  of fixed effects. There
are several reasons  for fixed effects to arise  in this  model  (see footnote  13).  The fixed
effects are correlated  with  regressors  because  the  model contains  lags and  leads of the
dependent  variable,  therefore  they  need  to  be removed  before  the  estimation,  One
common  procedure  for removing fixed effects is mean-differencing.  However, since the
regressors  are not strictly  exogenous  (see discussion  in section  2.6), mean-differencing
would  create  biased  estimates.  I use forward  mean-differencing,  which  removes only
the  forward  mean,  i.e.  the mean  of all the future  observations  available  for each firm-
year.  The  forward  mean-differencing  preserves  orthogonality  between  transformed
errors  and  untransformed  original variables,  which  are used  as instruments.  Arellano
and  Bover  (1995) show that  when  moments  are  formed  by  summing  over firms  and
periods, as opposed  to treating  each year as a unique set of moments,  and when there  is
no serial  correlation  in the  error term,  the  forward  mean-differencing  is more efficient
than  the  more  commonly  used  first-differencing.  In  addition,  the  first-differencing
induces serial correlation  in the errors  and  requires  appropriate  error-correction,  while
the  forward  mean-differencing  preserves  the  error  structure.14
"4The  forward  mean-differencing,  also referred  to as the Helmert procedure,  was used to estimate
investment models by Bond and Meghir (1994) and  Gilchrist and  Himmelberg (1998).
15The country-time dummies, d,,t, are removed by country-time differencing  of all
variables, i.e.  regressors and instruments  (the regressors are time-differenced after
the forward mean-differencing,  but the order of transformations is not important).
As discussed in section 2.6, the expectation error eit is orthogonal to the informa-
tion available at the time when the investment decision is made, which I assume to
be t - 1. As noted above, after the forward mean-differencing,  the transformed errors
are still orthogonal to the untransformed original variables dated t - s, where s > 1.
Therefore, I use the GMM procedure, implemented as IV (instrumental variables),
with t - 1 and t - 2 lags of instruments.  The instruments are all the variables in the
regression, plus cash flow, cost of goods sold, industry dunmiies and the interactions
of cash, sales and investment with FD (see Table 2 for variable definitions).
In all regressions I use heteroskedasticity robust estimates of the standard errors,
which do not require an assumption of the independence of errors within the firm
(implemented with  Stata's  cluster option).  To eliminate influential observations, I
exclude 1% on each side of the distribution for each of the variables in the regression
prior to transformations.
4  Data
All firm level data  come from the Worldscope database, which contains data  on
large publicly traded  firms in which there is an investor interest.  Using only large
publicly traded firms allows one to compare "apples to apples" across countries and
separate the effects of different financial and legal environments, which is the center of
attention here. An additional benefit of using these data is the attempt  by Worldscope
to standardize accounting information to improve cross-country comparability.' 5 The
drawback of the sample is that  it does not have data on large non-public firms. Even
'5For example, if one company reports  sales with  included excise tax  and  another  company ex-
cludes it, Worldscope corrects this difference and presents both with excluded tax.  This is important
for my study because I use sales as a measure of MPK and want to have as much cross-country com-
parability  as possible.
16though  I cannot  extend  the  findings  from the  large  public  firms to  all firms without
the  appropriate  data,  there  is a lot  to  be learned  on  the  cross country  differences  in
this  sample.
The firm data  are available  for 40 countries  and  cover over 7000 firms for the years
1988-1998 (however the  years before 1991 and the  year  1998 have fewer observations).
Details  on the sample selection are given in Appendix  1. The coverage within countries
varies  widely  from as  little  as  1% of all  listed  domestic  firms included  (for India)  to
as  many  as  82%  (for  Sweden),  as  calculated  by  LLSV  (1997)  who  use  the  same
sample.  Table  1 gives the  list  of countries  in the  sample  with  the  number  of firms
and  observations  per  country.  The  number  of firms  in  each  country  varies  widely
across  the  countries,  and  the  less  developed  countries  are  underrepresented.  This
creates  a problem  with  pooled  cross-country  estimation,  though  it is mitigated  using
the  empirical  techniques  discussed  in the  next  section.  The  main  firm-level variables
are investment  and  sales,  scaled  by  the  beginning  of the  period  capital,"6 and  stock
of liquid  assets  (cash  stock).  Other  variables  are  defined  in Table  2.
The  main  country-level  indicator  is an  index  of financial  development,  FD.  It  is
equal  to  the  sum  of  the  (standardized)  indices  of  the  stock  market  development,
STKMKT,  and  financial  intermediaries  development,  FININT,  which  come  from
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine  (1996) (they  refer to these  indices as Indexl  and  Findexl
respectively).  The  STKMKT  is the  sum of three  standardized  measures:  market  cap-
italization  over GDP  (i.e.  the  size of the  stock market),  total  value  traded  over GDP,
and  total  value  traded  over market  capitalization  (two  measures  of liquidity  of the
market).  The  FININT  is the  sum  of two standardized  measures:  the  ratio  of liquid
liabilities  (M3) to GDP  (i.e.  the overall size of the credit  market)  and  the credit  going
16The model  requires one to use the beginning  of the period capital stock as a scaling  factor for
calculating  adjustment  costs and MPK. One alternative is to use lagged  capital stock (i.e. period t-1
used as the beginning  of the period t capital stock). However,  this would  not be appropriate  if there
are mergers,  acquisitions,  divestitures  or other capital-changing  events, which  are hard to identify.
I use the approximate  value given  by the ending  period capital, minus investment  and depreciation
in that year, which  is more robust to the capital-changing  events, as discussed  in Love  (1999).
17to  the private  sector over GDP  (the amount of credit that  is relevant to the firm's
financing).
Thus the FD index combines five important  characteristics of financial markets
into a standardized measure, similar to the ones used in other studies. For a robust-
ness check, I also use the real growth of GDP (a country-year variable) as an indicator
of the business cycle conditions in each country, which are also thought to affect the
financing constraints (discussed in section 6). Table 2 lists the rest of the country-level
variables (and their sources), which are discussed in the relevant sections below.
Table 3 reports  means and medians of the  key variables, by country.  Table 4
reports cross-country correlations of the country averages for these variables. Several
patterns  stand out in these correlations. First, sales to capital, SK, is correlated with
investment to capital, IK, which could imply that  countries with higher productivity
invest more (of course no claim is made about  the  causality of this  relationship).
Second, FD appears to be positively correlated with the sales to  capital ratio, SK.
This  seemingly counter-intuitive result  is likely due to  differences in industry  and
sample compositions across countries and should not be interpreted causally. Third,
FD is positively correlated with IK, although this correlation is not significant, so it is
not clear if financial development increases investment on average. Finally, the cash
stock is correlated with investment and sales. The interpretation  of this relationship
is done using the regression analysis below.  Most of the country-level institutional
characteristics are highly correlated with each other (Panel B, Table 4) and therefore
should not be included in the regressions simultaneously.
5  Main  Results
As is clear from Table 1, the number of firms included in the sample varies widely
across the countries. The US and UK have more than  1000 firms per country, while
the rest of the countries have only 136 firms on average (Japan  is the third largest
with over 600 firms).  Such a prevalence of US and  UK companies will overweight
18these  countries  in the  cross-country  regressions  and  prevent  smaller  countries  from
influencing  the  coefficients,  especially  when  the  variable  of interest  is the  interaction
with  the  country-level  financial  development  index.  To  correct  for  this  I  use  two
approaches:  the  first  is  the  rank-based  approach,  and  the  second  is the  weighted
regressions  approach,  discussed  below.
The rank-based  approach  is based  on the  reasoning  that  to have a meaningful  test
for  the  financial  development  effect  on  financing  constraints,  one  needs  to  compare
apples  to  apples,  i.e., large  firms  in one country  to  large firms  in another  country.' 7
Therefore,  the  regressions  include  only  the  largest  firms  within  each  country.  The
inclusion  criteria  are based  on firm  ranking,  where  rank  1 is given to the  largest  firm
in its country.  Since there  is no a priori  criteria  to select any  specific number  of firms,
I experiment  with  different  cutoff points  and  report  results  for 50,  100, 150 and  200
largest  firms.
The weighted regression  approach  assigns a country-specific  weight, which  is equal
to  the  inverse of the  number  of observations  in each country.  Countries  with  a lot of
observations  get  a smaller  weight  and  countries  with  fewer observations  get  a larger
weight,  so  that  the  number  of  observations  is  equalized  across  all  countries.  This
method  uses all  the  available  observations,  which  results  in efficiency gains.
The main  results  are based  on the  model  given  in (10) and  are reported  in Table
5.  Models  1-4 use the  rank-based  approach  with  different  cutoff points,  and  model  5
uses the  weighted regression  approach.  All coefficients have their  predicted  signs and
are significant  at  conventional  levels, with  the  most  significant  coefficients  resulting
in the  150 largest  firms regression  (model 3) and  weighted regression  (model  5) where
all  the  coefficients are  significant  at  the  1% level.  The  main  variables  of interest  are
the  cash stock and  the  interaction  of cash stock with  the  financial development  index,
FD.  The  main  hypothesis,  stated  in  (12), is that  the  cash  coefficient  is positive  and
17It is plausible to argue that  some small companies in the US have less access to external finance
than  the  few largest companies in, for example, Malaysia or Thailand,  which in the  sample period
enjoyed more attention  from domestic and  outside investors than  many small US companies.
19the interaction is negative.  This result is obtained in all the regressions in Table 5.
This confirms the main claim of this paper, that  financial development decreases the
sensitivity of investment to availability of internal funds, measured by the cash stock
(this sensitivity is interpreted as a proxy for the financing constraints).
5.1  Structural  Parameters
The  interpretation  of the  coefficients magnitudes  is best  done in  terms of the
parameters  of the underlying structural  model, which are given by expressions in
(11).  To identify the structural  parameters I use the minimum-distance estimator,
described in Himmelberg (2000) (details on this  estimator  are available from the
author).  There are 5 equations and  8 parameters, therefore not all the parameters
can be identified. I choose to identify (Q,  g, a, a1, a2) and  assume the values for the
remaining parameters.  I assume a depreciation rate 6 =  0.12, which is the sample
average of the depreciation expense to capital ratio. The coefficient  0, which translates
sales to capital ratio into MPK in (7), is assumed to be equal to 0.23 (this corresponds
to the values for the capital share ak =  0.3 and markup IL  =1.318). Finally, I assume
the  value for the  linearization  parameter  -y =  1.2, which is equal to  the  average
marginal benefit of investment, discussed in section 2.6.19 The resulting structural
parameters are reported at the bottom of Table 5. Although there is some variation
among the estimated  parameters,  the  average values seem plausible.  The  average
discount rate  /3 is equal to  0.8 (and  several models imply a  discount rate  of 0.9),
which seems quite reasonable. Note that country and time specific discount rates are
captured  by the country-time dummies so the estimated  3 represents an  "average"
discount rate, which is hard to identify in panel data.
The parameters of the adjustment cost function have average values a =6.5 (this
l8The estimate of markup is taken from Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited  (1995), and it corresponds
to a demand elasticity of -4.
19I assume that  MPK is approximately equal to 0.2 (taken from Gilchrist and Hlimmelberg (1998))
and the marginal adjustment  cost term  is 0.2.  Since the  value of  y depends on the values of other
parameters,  I experimented  with an  iterative  procedure  when a  was determined  at  every stage of
minimization using the  parameter  values at that  stage. This produced qualitatively  similar results.
20excludes insignificant value from model 1) and  g=0.23.  The  parameter g is quite
stable and  always significant (which confirms the extended functional form for the
adjustment  costs), while a  varies quite a bit and  is less significant in general.  The
marginal adjustment costs function is then given by c =  6.5(  I  - 0.23  I  - vi).
Since the average I  in the data is approximately 0.18, the difference  of the first two
terms is equal to  0.14. The magnitude of the marginal adjustment cost depends on
the parameter  vi, which is not possible to estimate separately since it is included in
the fixed effects. For example, if vi is in the range 0-0.1, the marginal adjustment cost
will be in the range 0.25-0.9, which is in line with  previous evidence (for example,
Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992).
Next, I analyze the financing constraints factor, e,  which is defined as a function
of the structural  parameters in  (6).  The sensitivity of e  to  change in cash stock
depends on the country's  level of FD. Thus, a firm in a country with high FD  (i.e.
one standard  deviation above the mean of FD) has close to zero sensitivity of e  to
the change in the cash stock. 20 This implies that  firms in countries with high financial
development, such as US, UK and Japan,  are not financially constrained. This is not
surprising given that  the sample mainly consists of large publicly traded firms. For a
firm in a country with an average FD, such as Spain, Prance and Israel, a one standard
deviation change in cash stock results in 6.5% decrease in the financing constraints
factor e,  which could be translated  as a change in cost of capital from 11% to  19%.
On the other side, for firms in countries with  low FD (i.e.  one standard  deviation
below the mean), such as Mexico, Brazil, or Chile, a one standard deviation decrease
in cash stock will decrease e by 13%, which implies an increase in the cost of capital
from 11% to 28%. Although these calculations are rough approximations, and appear
a bit on the high side (i.e. imply quite large changes in cost of capital), they suggest
that financial development has a very large and economically significant effect on the
20For simplicity,  in all the calculations  I assume that the financial  development  index has a mean
of zero and standard  deviation of one. The actual  mean and standard  deviation are -0.03, and 1.14
respectively. I also use values al  = 1 and a2  =  -1,  while the  average values from Table 5, ignoring
insignificant estimates, are 0.96 and -0.99 respectively.
21financing constraints.
6  Tests  of Alternative  Explanations
6.1  Size  Effect
One potential problem with the main results (that financial development decreases
financing constraints) is the omitted effect of company's size on its financing con-
straints.  Firm size has been commonly used to identify firms that  are more likely
to be financially constrained (see Schiantarelli (1995) for a survey). The small firms
are more likely to suffer from financing constraints  (i.e.  have larger coefficients  on
the financial variables) because information asymmetries are larger.  If more finan-
cially developed countries have larger firms, as argued by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales
(1999), then the  estimated FD  effect could be  attributed  to  the differences in  the
firm size rather than financial development. To test this, I add the interaction of size
(measured by the  log of total  assets in US dollars) with cash stock to the baseline
model:
Kit  =:  'K  +)2K  +  03 K  +  3 4Cashi,t-j + 35Cashi,t-FDr  (13)
+i36Cash,,t-,Sizei,tij  + fi + deXt  + eit
The test now is that  the main hypothesis (04  >  0 and  35 <  0) still holds and also
06  < 0, i.e. financing constraints are smaller for larger firms. 2'  The instruments now
include size and interaction of size with investment, cash and sales.
The results with weighted regressions are presented in Table 9. I first test whether
size has any effect when included by itself (i.e. in the model (13) only Cashi,ti  Sizei,t-j
2"Note that size enters Euler equation only as interaction with the cash stock (proxy for the
financing  constraints), and not in levels. If there is any level effect, it is captured by the fixed
effects. One problem  this size test is the nature of the sample,  which mainly consists  of the large
firms. Nevertheless,  there is some variation in size among the firms in most countries, which is
exploited  for this test.  At worst, the sample selection  creates  bias against finding  any size effect.
22interaction is included).  Model 1 in Table 6 shows that  there is a significant size ef-
fect, that  is larger firms have smaller cash coefficients.  For example, for the firm with
the mean size, the cash coefficient is equal to  0.12, and for the firm with size equal
to one standard  deviation below the mean the cash coefficient equals 0.3, almost a
triple increase in the investment sensitivity.  Next, I include the interaction of cash
with financial development in addition to the size interaction (model 2, Table 6) and
find that  both interactions are significant at 1%. This confirms that  the financial de-
velopment effect is not caused by the differences  in the size of the firms and that both
size and financial development have an independent effect on financing constraints.
This methodology allows me to address another interesting empirical question: Is
the size effect equal in all countries, or is it related to financial development?  The
intuition is that  the  largest firms in less financially developed countries could still
enjoy an abundance of external finance (obtained through  access to external capital
markets,  or political connections), while smaller firms will be comparatively more
disadvantaged. I test this with an augmented model:
- I  - +  -2  S  3  3+  4Cashit-, + f 5Cashi,t-±FD,  (14)
Kit  Ki't+1  Ki't-1  Kit
+/36Cashi,t-iSizei,t-1  + 37Cashi,t-1Sizei,t-1FD,  + fi + d,,t + eit
The test  now is on the  triple  interaction  coefficient, and  I expect /7  >  0, that  is
financial underdevelopment has  more effect on the  small firms  (i.e.  less negative
effect on the large firms), and all previous hypothesis are expected to hold:  /34  >  0,
/35  < 0 and /6  < 0.
The results are reported in model 3, Table 6. All 4 coefficients /4  - j7 (cash, cash
interaction with  FD, cash interaction  with size, and triple  interaction  of cash, size
and FD) have their predicted signs and are significant at the 1% level. This suggests
that financial development has a differential effect on firms of different sizes. That  is
the small firms are affected significantly more than the large firms are.
For a robustness check of this result, I define a dummy variable, which is equal
23to  one if the size of the firm (measured as the log of total  assets) is smaller than
the  median size in  its country  (note that  this definition reverses the  signs on the
size interactions).  This definition is more robust  to differences in firm size across
countries, but is less robust to differences  in the sample size across countries (because
for the  countries with  the small samples, some of the  large firms are classified as
small).  The results, in model 4, although slightly weaker than in model 3, confirm
the above conclusion that small firms are significantly more affected by FD.
To quantify the relative difference  in financing constraints of large and small firms
I use estimates from the model 3. Thus, in a country with the average FD, the average
size firm has cash coefficient  of 0.15, while the small firm (i.e. the size of one standard
deviation below the average) has the coefficient of 0.38. However, in a country with
low FD  (i.e.  one standard  deviation below the average), the average size firm has
cash coefficient  of 0.19, while the small firm has the coefficient of 0.58. Thus the size
effect (the difference in coefficients  of firms with different sizes) is about 35% larger
for a country with low financial development, relative to a country with an average
financial development.
Another way I address this question is by splitting the sample on high and low
financial development subsamples (based on the median FD) and estimating cash and
size coefficients (i4  and  06)  from the model in (14) separately for each subsample.
These results are presented in Table 7. For the high FD sample, neither cash nor cash
interaction with size are significant, while for the low FD sample both  are large and
very significant. This shows that  even in the sample of large publicly traded  firms,
the financing constraints  are a significant issue for the countries with a low level of
financial development, which not only have higher financing constraints on average,
but have disproportionately larger constraints for the smaller firms.
246.2  Business  Cycles
In this  section  I consider  how the  differences in the  countries  business  cycles could
affect  my results  on financing  constraints.  Recall from the  discussion  above that  the
main  idea behind  the  financing  constraints  theory  is that  the  information  asymmetry
between borrowers  and lenders  creates  the  agency costs, which manifest  themselves  in
the wedge between  internal  and  external  financing  costs.  These costs decrease  with an
increase  in the  borrower's  net  worth  because,  for example,  an increase  in the  personal
stake  decreases  the  incentives  to misallocate  the  funds.  Since the  net  worth  is likely
to  be  procyclical,  the  agency  costs  will decline  in  booms  and  rise  in  recessions.  In
other  words,  external  financing  is  easier  to  obtain  during  good  times  (when  profits
are high  and  balance  sheets  are  healthy).2 2
One  potential  concern  with  my result  on  the  financial  development  effect  is that
the  sensitivity  of investment  to  internal  funds  could  reflect  different  stages  in  the
countries'  business  cycles,  rather  than  the  average  level  of financial  development.
That  is, over the  short  period  covered by  my sample,  it could  happen  that  countries
with  low level of financial  development  happen  to be in recessions  on  average.
To  test  this  possibility,  I  include  the  interaction  of the  real  GDP  growth  rate,
grGDPd,  a  measure  of the  economic  conditions  in  the  country,  with  the  firm-level
measure  of the  internal  funds,  the  cash stock.  Since the effect of the economic  growth
is expected to manifest  itself in the same time  period as investment,  i.e.  growth  at time
t is expected  to affect investment  at  time t,  the interaction  timing  is Cashjt- 1 grGDP,t,
where  as before  the  cash  stock  represents  available  liquid  assets  at  the  beginning  of
the  period  t  (i.e.  end  of period  t  - 1).  If the  economic  boom  periods  (i.e.  periods
with  high  GDP  growth)  are  associated  with  the  lower level of financing  constraints,
this  interaction  is expected  to  be negative.
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  8.  The  interaction  of GDP  growth  with  cash
22This intuition  has  been  formalized and  tested  on  US data  by  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),
Gertler  and Hubbard  (1988), Kashyap, Lamont  and Stein (1994) and Gertler  and  Gilchrist (1994),
among  others.
25stock  is indeed  negative  and  significant  at  the  5% level in three  out  of 4 models  (it is
only marginally  significant,  at  17%, in model 3).  This  implies that  favorable economic
conditions  do  improve  financing  constraints,  in  line  with  previous  evidence  on  US
data.  The effect  of financial  development  on financing  constraints  is not significantly
affected  by the  addition  of the  GDP  growth  interaction:  the  FD interaction  remains
significant  at  1% in model  2 and  at  2% in model  4.  This  robustness  check confirms
that  the  overall  level of the  country's  financial  development  is a significant  predictor
of the firm's  financing  constraints,  even after controlling  for the  business cycle effects.
6.3  Legal  System  Indicators
The  distinguishing  feature  of the  modern  corporation  is the  large  set  of laws that
create  the  environment  in  which  it  operates  (Zingales,  2000).  The  firm's  financing
activity  is largely based  on the financial contracts  or securities  and the defining feature
of these  securities  are  the  rights  that  they  bring  to  their  owners  (Hart,  1995).  The
differences in these  rights and  their enforcement  across the  countries  have been a focus
of recent  developments  in the  literature,  pioneered  by LLSV  (1997, 1998). They  argue
that  "the  [legal] protection  investors  receive  determines  their  readiness  to  finance
firms,"  and  show that  the legal environment  has large  effects on  the size and  breadth
of capital  markets  across  countries.  LLSV  also point  out  that  the  legal  systems  of
most countries  could be categorized  into several broad  legal families, which come from
the English,  French,  German,  and  Scandinavian  origin.  The  countries  inherited  these
legal  traditions  from  their  colonizers,  and  the  consequent  development  of the  legal
system  largely  depends  on this  "origin."  The  apparent  exogeneity  of this  legal origin
to  subsequent  economic  development  has been  used to reinforce  the  arguments  about
the  causality  from  the  financial  development  to  economic  growth  (see Levine,  1999
and  Beck et  al.,  1999).
It  is easy to  argue  that  better  legal protection  of investors  should  allow for  more
efficient  contracts  and  their  enforcement,  which  in  turn  should  reduce  the  cost  of
external  finance.  The  goal  here  is to  test  whether  the  legal  variables  are  associated
26with  decreasing  sensitivity  of investment  to  availability  of internal  funds.  This  will
imply  that  better  legal protection  has  the  "real"  consequences,  i.e.  allows  for more
efficient capital  allocation  by diminishing  financing  constraints.  The previous  research
(LLSV and  others)  identified  several legal system  indicators  such as the  efficiency of
the  legal system,  the  rule of law, the  risk of expropriation,  corruption,  and legal origin
dummies  (see Table  2 for variable  definitions  and original  sources of this  data).  These
indicators  measure  different  aspects  of the legal environment.  For example,  efficiency
and  the  rule  of law  measure  the  quality  of the  law  enforcement,  i.e.  how  well  the
laws on  the  books  are  enforced  by  the  courts.  Corruption  measures  the  distortions
introduced  by  the  courts  and  the  government  into  the  functioning  of the  financial
and  real  sectors  of the  economy. The  accounting  standards  measure  the  quality  of
information  available  to investors  and  should  therefore  reduce  the  external  financing
costs  associated  with  information  availability.
I use the  baseline  model  in (10) and  replace  FD  with  each of the  legal indicators.
As shown  in the  Table  9, each indicator  has  a negative  effect  on the  cash coefficient
when  included  by  itself  (all  models  with  odd  numbers).  The  results  for legal  origin
are also consistent  with  the  previous  evidence:  FRench origin increases  financing  con-
straints  (model 11) and English  origin decreases  the constraints  (model  13).  However,
when any of these indicators  are included  together  with FD,  they  become insignificant,
while  FD  continues  to  be  highly  significant  (all  models  with  even  numbers).  Given
these  results,  it  appears  that  the  index  of financial  development  is a better  summary
measure  of the  differences  in the cost  of external  finance  than  the  individual  legal  in-
dicators  are.  In other  words,  the  legal system  differences  are already  reflected  in  the
level of financial  development,  and  so the  legal system  affects the  capital  allocation
only indirectly,  through  better  functioning  capital  markets.
6.3.1  Legal  Origin  as  Instrument  for  Financial  Development
The causality  of the financial  development  and  growth  correlation  has been  debated
since the first empirical  study  of this  relationship  by King and  Levine (1993).  Sceptics
27of the finance-growth link have pointed out that the financial systems simply responds
to  the  demands of the  growing economies and  therefore is endogenous to  growth
(Lucas, 1988).  Others  argued that  the  financial development could be  a  leading
indicator of growth as financial markets anticipate the increased economic activity
and develop in anticipation of this activity (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The potential
endogeneity of the  financial development is a  valid concern in the country-level or
even in the industry-level study (as financial markets could respond to the anticipated
growth of some individual industries).  However,  this endogeneity becomes less likely
in the firm-level  study and financial development could safely be considered exogenous
to the growth of any given firm. Nevertheless, the test with legal origin as instrument
for the financial development could provide a useful robustness check on the results
and it is the goal in this section.
I use the baseline model (10) and include FD interaction with cash as a regressor.
However, now I do not include FD interactions in the instruments  list and replace
them with legal origin dummies and their interactions with the firm level variables.
Thus,  only the component  of financial development that  is explained by the legal
origin is allowed to  influence the  investment sensitivity.  The results  presented in
the Table 10 are remarkably similar to the main results in the Table 5, with slight
decrease in the significance of the cash coefficients, but the FD interaction continues
to be significant at  1% level in all the regressions (except "rank 50," which was only
significant at  10% before and now is significant at  5%)  23  The  conclusion of this
section is that  the main result is unchanged with the use of legal origin as instrument
for the financial development.
6.4  Single  Country  Regressions
This  section describes an  alternative  way to  address  the relationship  between
financial development and financing constraints.  Recall that  with the cross-country
23It is also interesting  to note that  the Hansen test  of overidentifying restrictions  is not rejected
at  1% level in the  models that  use legal origin as instrument  for FD.
28regressions the financing constraints are parametrized as a linear function of the index
of financial development, FD, given by equation  (6).  An alternative approach is to
allow each country to have different levels of financing constraints (measured by the
coefficient on cash stock), given by Oit = aoi + acCashit-1. The country-specific cash
coefficient, a,,  is obtained in the first stage regressions, where the Euler equation is
estimated separately for each country using the model:
i  I  +02  I  +03 K  + a,Cashit-,  + dt + fi + eit.  (15)
As before, fi  denotes fixed effects (see footnote  13), and dt denotes time dummies.
Then, I estimate the second-stage regression, in which the coefficients  a  are regressed
on the country-level index of financial development (FD) using the model:
'a  = bo  + bIFD, + e,.  (16)
The main hypothesis now is that  b, < 0, that  is, the first stage estimates of the cash
coefficients, -a, are negatively related to the index of financial development, FD,.  The
second stage regression in (16) is estimated by OLS. 24
The single-country regressions are not as efficient as cross-country regressions be-
cause they require estimating 200 coefficients (5 per country for 40 countries) rather
than  estimating only 6.  However, this  approach has a few advantages:  first, it  is
completely unrestricted in a sense that  all the coefficients  are allowed to vary across
countries. Second, it allows one to estimate the average level of financing constraints
for each country, while the cross-country regressions leave a  "black box" feeling be-
cause only the slope, bl, is estimated.
Table 11 reports the results of estimating  (15) separately for each country. The
24Since  the dependent  variable  is estimated in stage 1, for proper  inference  the generated  regressors
adjustment is required. However,  due to the nature of this methodology,  such an adjustment proves
to be quite complicated  and it is ignored  in this version  of the paper. Therefore,  the errors  reported
in stage 2 are not asymptotically  correct and  are used as an approximation.
29cash stock  coefficients range from zero (25th percentile)  to  0.35 (75th percentile),
with  a mean  of 0.17 and  a  median of 0.11.  These statistics  are in line with the
cash coefficients estimated in the cross-country regressions (which were varying from
0.10 to 0.17, Table 5).  However, most of the cash coefficients are not significant at
conventional levels, often due to the small sample size in the individual countries. 25
Despite the problem with low efficiency,  the coefficients are consistent and present
interesting patterns,  analyzed below.
Using the  model in  (16), I regress the country-level cash coefficients on the FD
index.  This  results  in a  coefficient of -0.18, significant at  1% level (the standard
error is 0.05 and R squared is 0.35). The scatterplot of cash coefficients  and financial
development, with predicted values from the above regression (the straight line) are
given in Figure 1. It shows  that  cash sensitivities exhibit a clear negative relationship
with financial development.  This confirms the result obtained  in section 5, which
found negative coefficients  on the interaction of cash stock and FD.
There is one visible outlier on the plot, Korea (KR), and for a robustness check I
ran the above regression without it, which results in a coefficient  of -0.16, significant
at  1% (the standard  error is 0.04 and R squared is 0.37).  It  is also interesting to
note that  the effect of the financial development on the cash coefficient, given by the
interaction term in cross-country regressions (which varied from 0.08 to 0.15, Table
5),  is similar to  the  effect found here in the single country regressions (the slope
of 0.16-0.18  in the second stage).  This make the single-country regressions a useful
robustness test, despite the problem of low efficiency  of individual coefficients.
7  Conclusions
This paper shows that  financing constraints,  measured by the sensitivity of in-
vestment to the  availability of internal funds, are significantly negatively related to
25This  problem  is exacerbated  by the fact that less  developed  countries,  that are expected  to have
larger  coefficients,  have a small number  of observations,  while more  developed  countries (which  have
more  observations)  are expected  to have coefficients  close  to zero.
30financial  development.  This  negative  effect remains  after controlling  for firm size and
the  country's  business  cycles, which  also affect  financing  constraints.  I also find that
small  firms  are  disproportionately  more  disadvantaged  in less financially  developed
countries  than  are large firms.  I also find that  legal system  indicators  (the efficiency of
the  legal system,  the  risk of expropriation,  corruption,  or legal origin)  are negatively
related  to  investment  sensitivity  (the  measure  of financing  constraints).  However,
they  lose  significance  when  financial  development  is added  to  the  regressions.  This
implies that  the  legal system  affects financing  constraints  indirectly,  through  better
developed  financial  markets.  The impact  of FD on financing  constraints  is unchanged
when  legal origin is used as an instrument  for financial  development.
The paper  makes contributions  to two strands  of literature.  First,  it contributes  to
the investment  literature  by estimating  a structural  investment  model and  confirming
the  presence  of financing  constraints  for  a  broad  range  of countries.  This  paper
extends  the  only  existing  cross-country  study,  in Bond  et  al.  (1997),  which  studies
investment  in  four  developed  countries.  Second,  and  more  important  from  a policy
perspective,  this paper  contributes  to the  economic development  and  growth literature
by  showing that  financial  development  diminishes  financing  constraints  by reducing
information  asymmetries  and  contracting  imperfections.  The  decrease  in  financing
constraints  allows firms to invest according to their growth opportunities  and therefore
improves  capital  allocation.
31Appendix 1. Sample Selection
All countries in the Worldscope database (May 1999 Global Researcher CD) with
at least 30 firms and at least 100 firm-year observations are included in the sample
(the exception is Venezuela (VE) which is included with 80 observations only); former
socialist economies are excluded. This results in a sample of 40 countries. The sample
does not include firms for which primary  industry is either financial (one digit SIC
code of 6) or service (one digit SIC codes of 7 and above).
In addition I delete the following (see Table 2 for variable definitions):
- All firms with 3 or less years of coverage;
- All firm-years  with  missing  CAPEX,  PPENT,  Sales,  and  cash;
- Observations with zero PPENT  (200 obs);
- Observations with negative KBEG (277 obs), Cash/Ta or COGS (27 obs);
- Observations with IK > 2.5 (1% of all obs);
- Observations  with  SK >  20  (5% of all  obs) ;26
- Observations with  Cogs/K  >  20 (80 obs.);
- Observations with Cash/Totass  >0.6 (1% of all obs);
- 50% of all US firms with  at least 4 years of data  available  was selected  by random
sample.27
The  resulting  dataset  has  about  59,500 observations,  the  number  of observations
by  country  is given in Table  1.
26This  rules excludes  firms for which  capital is not a big factor in production. Half  of these were
in the US and UK; Japan, France  and Denmark  totaled 25%.
27The original sample for the US had over 25,700 observations  (firm-years)  while for all other
countries at most  there are  12,000 for the  UK, 5,000 for Japan,  less then  1,000 for most  countreis
(see Table 1). Even after  the sampling, the US has the  most data available.
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37Table 1. Sample Coverage  Across Countries
Country  Number  of  Percent  of total  Number  Average  number
Country  code  observations  observations  of firms  of years per firm
Argentina  AR  198  0.003  28  7.1
Austria  AT  454  0.008  55  8.3
Australia  AU  1571  0.026  197  8.0
Belgium  BE  561  0.009  71  7.9
Brazil  BR  687  0.012  94  7.3
Canada  CA  3382  0.057  391  8.6
Switzerland  CH  1043  0.017  132  7.9
Chile  CL  411  0.007  55  7.5
Colombia  CO  150  0.003  20  7.5
Germany  DE  3970  0.067  468  8.5
Demnark  DK  1045  0.018  126  8.3
Spain  ES  947  0.016  114  8.3
Finland  Fl  747  0.013  84  8.9
France  FR  3274  0.055  402  8.1
United Kingdom  GB  9931  0.166  1129  8.8
Hong Kong  HK  969  0.016  142  6.8
Indonesia  ID  531  0.009  84  6.3
Ireland  IE  427  0.007  47  9.1
Israel  IL  152  0.003  29  5.2
India  IN  1507  0.025  269  5.6
Italy  IT  1149  0.019  132  8.7
Japan  JP  4646  0.078  624  7.4
South Korea  KR  1264  0.021  187  6.8
Mexico  MX  502  0.008  69  7.3
Malaysia  MY  1476  0.025  205  7.2
Netherlands  NL  1280  0.021  147  8.7
Norway  NO  680  0.011  84  8.1
New Zealand  NZ  315  0.005  43  7.3
Peru  PE  101  0.002  17  5.9
Philippines  PH  271  0.005  43  6.3
Pakistan  PK  418  0.007  72  5.8
Portugal  PT  254  0.004  42  6.0
Sweden  SE  1162  0.019  137  8.5
Singapore  SG  841  0.014  122  6.9
Thailand  TH  1045  0.018  177  5.9
Turkey  TR  145  0.002  23  6.3
Taiwan  TW  405  0.007  83  4.9
USA  US  10422  0.175  1247  8.4
Venezuela  VE  81  0.001  11  7.4
South Africa  ZA  1151  0.019  135  8.5
Total  59565  7537
Average  number of firms  per country  188
Average  number  of firms  per country,  excluding US and GB  136
Median  number of firms  per country, excluding  US and GB  114Table 2. Variable Definitions:
Abbreviation  Description
Firm Level variables  (from Worldscope)
PPENT  Property Plant and Equipment, net of depreciation
CAPEX  Capital expenditure
DA  Depreciation  and Amortization  expense
K  Beginning  period  capital = PPENT-CAPEX+DA
IK, I/K  Investment  to Capital  ratio = CAPEX  / K
SK, S/K  Sales to Capital ratio = Sales / K
Cash  Cash plus equivalents  scaled by Total Assets (or scaled by K for robustness  checks)
CF  Cash Flow (Net income + DA), scaled by K
COGS  Cost of goods sold, scaled by K
Size  Log of total assets in US dollars
Rank  Ranking  based on size of PPENT  (first,  ranked by year, then averaged  over the years), largest  firm
in each country has rank equal  to one (described  in section 5.1).
Weight  Weight is a country-level  variable  equal to one over the number  of valid observations  per country
(described  in section 5.  1).
Industry  For manufacturing  industries  the dummies  are on a two digit SIC level and for the rest of
dummies  industries  they are on a one digit level.
Country-Level  variables
STKMKT  Stock  market development  is Index  1 from Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine (1996), equals  to the sum
of (standardized  indices of) market capitalization  to GDP,  total value  traded to GDP,  and turnover
(total value traded to market capitalization).
FININT  Financial intermediary  development  is Findexl from Demurguc-Kunt  and Levine (1996),  equals to
the sum of (standardized  indices of) ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP,  and ratio of domestic  credit
to private sector to GDP.
FD  Financial  Development  = STKMKT+FININT.
Legal  Origin  Country's  legal origin categorized  into 4 groups: English, French, German  or Scandinavian,  from
LLSV (1998).
Efficiency,  Efficiency  of legal system and Rule of Law are two measure of the quality  of law enforcement,
Rule of Law  from LLSV (1998).
Expropriation  Risk of expropriation  is the risk of outright confiscation  or forced confiscation  by the government,
from LLSV (1998).
Corruption  The  measure of corruption,  from LLSV (1998).
GNP PC  Log of GNP  per capita in US dollars  in 1994, World  Development  Report 1996.
grGDP  Annual real growth rate of GDP,  IFSTable 3. Descriptive  Statistics  for Key Variables
Summary  statistics  by country  for  main variables.  Variables  definitions  are given in Table  2.  Outliers  (far away  Max or
Min) are underlined.
Cash  I/K  S/K  Financial  Development
Country  mean  median  mean  median  mean  median  FD  FININT  STKMKT
Argentina  0.08  0.04  0.19  0.13  1.6  1.2  -1.38  -0.79  -0.59
Austria  0.10  0.07  0.25  0.20  4.4  3.0  -0.27  -0.12  -0.15
Australia  0.08  0.05  0.26  0.18  3.3  2.3  0.42  0.23  0.19
Belgium  0.10  0.08  0.25  0.20  4.0  3.7  -0.82  -0.35  -0.47
Brazil  0.08  0.04  0.12  0.09  1.7  1.0  -1.04  -0.75  -0.29
Canada  0.07  0.02  0.23  0.18  3.1  1.5  0.03  -0.06  0.09
Switzerland  0.14  0.11  0.23  0.15  3.9  2.6  2.2  1.45  0.75
Chile  0.07  0.04  0.21  0.16  1.6  1.3  -0.75  -0.29  -0.46
Colombia  0.08  0.04  0.26  0.14  3.6  1.9  -1.6  -0.72  -0.88
Germany  0.08  0.05  0.31  0.25  5.5  4.8  1.68  0.3  1.38
Denmark  0.15  0.14  0.24  0.21  4.4  3.7  -0.49  -0.12  -0.37
Spain  0.06  0.04  0.14  0.09  2.8  1.8  -0.14  0.11  -0.25
Finland  0.09  0.08  0.38  0.21  5.0  3.2  -0.41  0.12  -0.53
France  0.12  0.09  0.27  0.21  6.5  6.0  0.1  0.31  -0.21
UK  0.09  0.06  0.22  0.17  4.6  4.0  1.68  0.45  1.23
Hong Kong  0.16  0.11  0.25  0.16  3.5  2.1  2.01
Indonesia  0.14  0.10  0.37  0.23  3.9  2.6  -1.17  -0.46  -0.71
Ireland  0.15  0.12  0.26  0.17  4.4  3.1  -0.45
Israel  0.11  0.10  0.30  0.24  3.7  3.0  0.01  -0.07  0.08
India  0.04  0.03  0.27  0.19  3.5  2.6  -0.7  -0.44  -0.26
Italy  0.12  0.09  0.26  0.17  4.4  3.0  -0.64  -0.13  -0.51
Japan  0.19  0.17  0.22  0.19  4.1  3.3  3.3  1.31  2.02
South Korea  0.08  0.06  0.31  0.23  3.9  3.0  0.84  -0.21  1.05
Mexico  0.08  0.06  0.11  0.10  1.6  1.3  -0.85  -0.71  -0.14
Malaysia  0.08  0.05  0.23  0.16  2.7  1.8  1.19  0.29  0.9
Netherlands  0.10  0.05  0.24  0.20  5.1  3.8  0.66  0.34  0.32
Norway  0.14  0.12  0.33  0.22  3.6  2.1  -0.15  0.03  -0.18
New Zealand  0.04  0.02  0.17  0.13  3.3  2.8  -0.53  -0.2  -0.33
Peru  0.09  0.04  0.22  0.14  1.5  1.3
Philippines  0.12  0.07  0.37  0.22  2.6  1.4  -1.15  -0.61  -0.54
Pakistan  0.11  0.04  0.26  0.19  4.8  2.5  -1.28  -0.46  -0.82
Portugal  0.06  0.03  0.22  0.13  3.3  2.0  -0.67  -0.06  -0.61
Sweden  0.12  0.08  0.31  0.19  4.7  3.8  -0.31  -0.21  -0.1
Singapore  0.19  0.15  0.28  0.22  3.6  2.5  1.6  0.56  1.04
Thailand  0.06  0.03  0.40  0.23  4.5  2.5  0.36  -0.02  0.38
Turkey  0.13  0.07  0.56  0.50  7.5  5.8  -1.2  -0.59  -0.61
Taiwan  0.13  0.09  0.20  0.14  2.5  1.8  0.64
US  0.09  0.04  0.24  0.19  4.8  3.8  1.35  0.14  1.21
Venezuela  0.09  0.06  0.21  0.13  1.5  1.1  -1.26  -0.52  -0.74
South Africa  0.09  0.06  0.22  0.19  4.7  3.8  0.25  -0.23  0.48
Mean  0.10  0.07  0.26  0.19  3.74  2.73  -0.03  -0.06  0.09
Median  0.09  0.06  0.25  0.19  3.78  2.60  -0.29  -0.12  -0.18
Std  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.06  1.33  1.20  1.14  0.51  0.79Table  4. Correlations
Correlations of country-level means and  medians of  the firmn  level variables and  country's institutional characteristics.
Variables definitions are in Table 2. Panel A:  below the diagonal are Pearson correlation coefficients, with two outlier
countries excluded: JP (Japan) and TR (Turkey).  Above the diagonal are Spearnan correlations (robust to outliers) with all
observations  included.  Including outliers for Pearson correlations  results in significant  correlation  for FD and Cash (due to JP
which is an outlier on both of these) and nonsignificant  correlation  for SK and FD (due to TR, which has very high SK and
low FD). Panel B: pearson correlations with all countries. (Excluding Japan makes correlaitons of GDP PC with FD and
FININT  significant  at 6% and 2 % respectively;  also correlation  between FININT and Log GDP becomes insignificant.)  P-
values  are in parenthesis;  bold are significant  at 5% or better, underlined  are significant  at 10%.
Panel A. Cross-Country  Correlations  of Firm Level Variables
Country Means  Country Medians
FD  Cash  IK  SK  FD  Cash  IK  SK
FD  0.15  0.02  0.34  0.21  0.21  0.44
(0.35)  (0.87)  (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.006)
Cash  0.21  0.32  0.36  0.21  0.36  0.32
(0.23)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.22)  (0.02)  (0.04)
IK  0.09  0.27  0.55  0.29  0.35  0.59
(0.59)  (0.099)  (0.0002)  (0.096)  (0.03)  (0.0001)
SK  0.41  0.24  0.49  0.45  0.23  0.56
(0.015)  (0.14)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.15)  (0.0003)
Panel B. Correlations of Country-Level  Institutional Characteristics
FD  FINTNT  STKMKT  Efficiency  Corruption  Expropr.  Accounting  GNPPC
FININT  0.90
(0)
STKMKT  0.95  0.73
(0)  (0)
Efficiency  0.52  0.52  0.45
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)
Corruption  0.51  0.55  0.40  0.83
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.01)  (0)
Expropriation  0.57  0.64  0.39  0.72  0.83
(0.001)  (0)  (0.02)  (0)  (0)
Accounting  0.34  0.28  0.34  0.31  0.41  0.36
(0.05)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.03)
GNP PC  0.56  0.61  0.46  0.74  0.87  0.84  0.46
(0)  (0.0)  (0.004)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.005)
GDP US  0.54  0.41  0.49  0.20  0.26  0.46  0.15  0.42
(0)  (0.01)  (0.002)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.003)  (0.39)  (0.01)Table 5. Main Results  on Financial  Development  and Financing  Constraints
The dependent variable is IK,, the model is given in (10); variable definitions are in Table 2.  The estimation is by GMM (IV),
country-time  and fixed effects  are removed  prior to estimation (see Section  3.1). Instruments are first and second  lags of IK, SK,
Cash, CFK, COGS,  interactions  of FD with IK, SK and Cash, and industry dummies. The firms are ranked based on the size of
PPENT (described in Section 5). In the weighted regression, weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of
observations  per country. Structural parameters as functions  of estimated coefficients  are given in (11). They are identified using
minimum distance estimator (see Section 5.1). The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying  restrictions; reported are p-values
(this test is not available for weighted regressions). Heteroskedasticity  adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,*  and a
represent significance  at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% respectively.
Model:  1  2  3  4  5
50 largest  100 largest  150 largest  200 largest  All, weighted
I'K,+,  0.688  0.671  0.543  0.571  0.273
(0.171)  ..  (0.137)  (0.132)  ..  (0.125)*4*  (0.135)
/Kt-  0.201  0.200  0.208  0.204  0.203
(0.022)  (0.016)  ..  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.018)  ..
S/K,  0.011  0.018  0.020  0.020  j  0.042
(0.011)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.009)
Cash,-,  0.132  0.081  0.124  0.102  0.174
(0.064)  (0.051)a  (0.046)  ..  (0.048)*  (0.062)..
Casht  i*FDc  -0.119  -0.136  -0.110  -0.082  I  -0.149
(0.046)*  (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.046)
Constant  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  j  -0.003
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  I  (0.002)*
N obs  6488  10477  12474  13922  !  21278
N firms  1436  2335  2791  3111  I  4794
0.000  0.010  0.103  0.086  j  0.208
RootMSE  0.127  0.128  0.121  0.123  !  0.130
Hansen test  0.340  0.001  0.001  0.002  NA
Structural  parameters:
beta  0.935  0.908  0.708  0.750  '  0.331
(0.288)  (0.227) ..  (0.201) ..  (0.193)  (0.173)
g  0.240  0.238  0.238  0.235  i  0.215
(0.034)  (0.024)  (0.020)  ..  (0.019)  (0.022)
alfa  16.825  9.719  7.069  7.600  1.718
(20.454)  (5.195)  (3.978)  (4.091) *  (1.135)
al  2.371  0.855  1.189  1.000  j  0.802
(2.428)  (0.601)a  (0.589)  (0.572)*  (0.341)
a2  -2.129  -1.448  -1.052  -0.798  j  -0.685
(2.139)  (0.666)*  (0.525)  (0.458)  (0.266)  ..Table 6. Size Effect
The dependent variable is IKt;  the models are described in section 6.1. The Size is equal to the (log of) total assets in US
dollars in models 1-3 and "Small"  dummy in model 4 (durnmy is equal to one if total assets are less than the country's own
median level of total assets).  The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time and  fixed effects are removed prior to
estimation (see Section 3.1).  Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CF, COGS, size and size interactions
with Cash, IK and SK, interactions of FD with IK, SK, Cash,  and size, and industry dummies. All the regressions  are
weighted regressions, weights  are  equal  to  a  value  of  one  divided by  the  number  of  observations per  country.
Heteroskedasticity  adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,*  and a represent significance at 1%, 5%. 10% and 15%
respectively.
Model:  1  2  3  4
I/Kt+ 1 0.484  0.310  0.295  0.348
(0.121)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.129)
1/K,-}  0.201  0.202  0.202  0.203
(0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019) ..  (0.018)
S/K,  0.035  0.039  0.040  0.036
(0.009)  (0.009) ..  (0.009)  (0.009)
Cash,,  0.616  0.721  0.870  0.081
(0.194)  (0.204)  (0.233)  (0.075)
Casht.l*Size,,  -0.095  -0.105  -0.134  0.200
(0.032)  (0.034) ...  (0.040) ...  (10.110)  *
Cash, ,*FDC  -0.146  -0.700  -0.048
(0.047)  (0.201)  (0.060)
Cash,- *Size  *FD,  0.099  -0.206
(0.032)  (0.095)
Constant  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
N obs  21777  21278  21278  21348
N firms  4934  4794  4794  4794
R2  0.137  0.198  0.1998  0.1865
Root MSE  0.136  0.131  0.131  0.133Table 7. Sample Splits
The dependent variable is IKl; variable definitions are in Table 2.  High FD and Low FD are samples split on the
median FD (reported in Table 3). The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time  and fixed effects  are removed
prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS and
industry dummies. All the regressions  are weighted regressions,  weights are equal to a value of one divided by the
number of observations per country. Heteroskedasticity  adjusted standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,and *
represent  significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
High FD  Low FD
Model:  1  2  3  4
I/Kt,l  0.505  0.472  0.427  0.424
(0.190)  (0.175)  (0.126) ..  (0.122)
I/Kf  0.209  0.211  0.198  0.198
(0.018)  (0.018) ...  (0.030)  (0.029)
S/K,  0.025  0.025  0.048  0.048
(0.008)'''  (0.008) ..  (0.015)'''  (0.015)'''
Casht-l  0.014  0.197  0.262  1.124
(0.051)  (0.180)  (0.104)  (0.364)..
Casht.i*Size,l  -0.033  -0.165
(0.030)  (0.061)
Constant  0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.003
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)
•  obs  18106  18106  3671  3671
N firns  3930  3930  1004  1004
R2  0.131  0.147  0.171  0.169
Root MSE  0.128  0.127  0.141  0.142Table  8.  Business Cycles  and Financing  Constraints
The dependent  variable is IK, the model is given in (10) with added interaction  of cash stock with country-year  real GDP
growth rate; variable definitions are in Table 2.  The estimation is by GMM (IV), country-time  and fixed effects are
removed prior to estimation (see Section 3.1).  Instrunents  are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS,
interactions  of FD and GDP growth with IK, SK and Cash, and industry dummies.  The firrns  are ranked based on the size
of PPENT (described  in Section 5). In the weighted  regression,  weights are equal  to a value of one divided by the number
of  observations per  country. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors  in parentheses; ***,**,*  and  a  represent
significance  at 1%, 5%, 10%  and 15% respectively.
150  largest  All, weighted
Model:  1  2  3  4
I/K,+}1  0.705  0.517  0.427  0.360
(0.145)  (0.135)  (0.116)  (0.125)
U/K,.,  0.198  0.202  0.193  0.194
(0.014)"'  (0.014)  (0.018)  (C.018)
S/K,  0.018  0.021  0.026  0.025
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)
Cash, 1 0.117  0.186  0.203  0.232
(0.043) "'  (0.048)  (0.062)  (0.068)
Cash,-l*grGDP,,  -1.720  -1.827  -1.578 l  -2.424
(0.881)  (0.870)  (1.150)  (1.228)
CashtI*FDc  -0.108  -0.117
(0.037)  (0.049)  2
Constant  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003
(0.001)  (0.001)a  (0.001)  (0.002)
N obs  12923  12411  22061  21549
N firTns  2935  2794  4973  4832
R2  0.000  0.126  0.145  0.167
Root MSE  0.131  0.122  0.136  0.136
'is significant  at 17%
2in  model  IV  the FD  interaction  is significant  at 2%  and grGDP  interaction  is significant  at 5%Table 9. Legal System  Indicators and Financing  Constraints
The dependent variable is IK,, the "baseline" model is given in (10) with FD interactions  replaced or supplemented
with each of the Indicator variable interactions (the rest of coefficients  are not reported). Variable definitions  are in
Table 2.  The estimation  is by GMM (IV), country-time  and fixed  effects are removed prior to estimation  (see Section
3.1). Instruments  are first and second lags of IK, SK, Cash,  CFK, COGS, interactions  of FD and appropriate  Indicator
with IK, SK and Cash, and industry dummies. All the regressions are weighted  regressions, weights are equal to a
value of  one divided by the  number of observations per country. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in
parentheses;  " andb represent significance  at 1%,  5%, 10%, 15% and 20% respectively.
Cash,-,  Cash,-,*Indicator,  Casht, *FD,
Model:  Indicator:
I  Efficiency  0.587  -0.052
0.234  0.027
2  Efficiency  0.338 b  -0.021  -0.123
0.245  0.030  0.050
3  Rule of Law  0.633  -0.060
0.245  0.027
4  Rule of Law  0.455  -0.037 b  -011 1
0.240  0.028  0.045
5  Corruption  0.670  -0.066
0.254  0.029
6  Corruption  0.479  -0.041"  -0.100
0.260  0.031  0.045
7  Expropriation  1.208  -0.119
0.480  0.051
8  Expropriation  0.850  -0.078 a  -0.097
0.495  0.054  0.045
9  Accounting  0.793  _0.010  a
0.437  0.006
10  Accounting  0.364  -0.003  -0.118
0.448  0.006  0.042
11  French  0.089 a  0.191
0.060  0.114
12  French  0.189  -0.044  -0.163
0.078  0.132  0.052
13  English  0.230  -0.191
0.080  0.100
14  English  0.177  -0.037  -0.141
0.072  0.096  0.046Table 10. Legal Origin as Instrument for Financial Development
The dependent variable is IK,, the model is given in (10); variable definitions are in Table 2. The estimation is by GMM
(IV), country-time  and fixed effects  are removed  prior to estimation (see Section 3.1). Instruments are first and second  lags
of IK, SK, Cash, CFK, COGS,  interactions of Legal Origin dummies with IK, SK and Cash,  (note that Legal Origin
replaces FD in the intsrument set). The firms are ranked based on the size of PPENT (described in Section 5). In the
weighted regression,  weights are equal to a value of one divided by the number of observations  per country. The Hansen test
is a  test  of  overidentifying restrictions, reported  are p-values (this  test  is  not  available for  weighted regressions).
Heteroskedasticity  adjusted standard errors in parentheses;  ***,**,*  and a represent significance at 1%, 5o/, 10% and 15%
respectively.
Model:  1  2  3  4  5
50 largest  100 largest  150 largest  200 largest  All, weighted
l/K,+,  0.627  0.692  0.665  0.670  0.473
(0.109)  (0.095)  (0.090)  (0.084)  (0.100)
1IK.  0.207  0.205  0.209  0.204  0.202
(0.020)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.019)
S/K,  0.016  0.017  0.015  0.016  0.029
(0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)'--
Cash,-,  0.118  0.078  0.109  0.093  0.144
(0.058)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.059)
Casht,*FDc  -0.108  -0.133  -0.118  -0.099  -0.148
(0.051)  (0.043) ...  (0.041)  (0.039) ...  (0.058)
Constant  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
N obs  6499  10502  12498  13961  21348
N firms  1433  2332  2788  3108  4794
2  0.042  0.004  0.026  0.020  0.133
RootMSE  0.124  0.129  0.127  0.129  0.137
Hansen test  0.197  0.019  0.029  0.036  N/ATable  11.  Single Country  Regressions
The  dependent  variable  is  IKt;  the  model  is  given  in  (15),  Section  7.1;  variable  definitions  are in  Table  2. The
estimation  is  by  GMM  (IV),  country-time  and  fixed  effects  are  removed  prior  to  estimation  (see  Section  3.1).
Instruments  are  first  and  second  lags  of  IK,  SK,  Cash,  CFK,  COGS,  and  industry  dummies.  Constants  are
included,  but  not  reported  since  they  are  very  close  to  zero  and  never  significant.  Heteroskedasticity  adjusted
standard  errors in parentheses;  ***,  *,  * and a represent  significance  at 1%, 5%, 10% and  15% respectively.
IfK,  1IKt.L  S/K_  Casht-.  Number
Code  Coeff.  St.error  Coeff.  St.error  Coeff.  St.error  Coeff.  St.error  of obs.
AR  0.96  0.318  0.21  0.096  -0.097  0.057  0.77  0.600  69
AT  0.40  0.467  0.17  0.051  -0.004  0.018  0.34  0.230  199
AU  0.80  0.321  0.26  0.042  -0.001  0.009  0.17  0.131  654
BE  0.26  0.178 '  0.14  0.097  0.087  0.032  0.71  0.336  215
BR  0.46  0.120  0.36  0.076  0.003  0.007  0.11  0.055  206
CA  0.62  0.130  0.28  0.044  0.033  0.011  0.01  0.102  1500
CH  0.41  0.304 '  0.22  0.083  0.047  0.018  -0.10  0.113  438
CL  0.51  0.211  0.37  0.184  0.033  0.048  0.45  0.411  162
CO  0.33  0.089  0.00  0.116  0.030  0.025  0.70  0.612  35
DE  0.97  0.107  0.18  0.036  0.000  0.006  -0.06  0.099  1825
DK  0.23  0.209  0.18  0.039  0.028  0.016  0.40  0.195  462
ES  0.78  0.100  0.25  0.061  -0.002  0.016  0.07  0.185  386
Fl  0.76  0.243  0.23  0.049  0.021  0.015 '  -0.01  0.349  297
FR  0.63  0.125  0.16  0.037  0.012  0.008  0.05  0.121  1358
GB  0.58  0.157  0.15  0.024  0.022  0.006  0.16  0.062  4084
HK  0.56  0.316  0.18  0.081  0.053  0.027  0.25  0.162  245
ID  0.12  0.295  -0.06  0.078  0.040  0.042  0.44  0.282  149
IE  0.72  0.136 . 0.20  0.062  0.014  0.014  0.08  0.258  167
IL  0.37  0.143  0.09  0.077  0.054  0.047  -0.03  0.477  32
IN  0.46  0.145  0.08  0.067  0.035  0.016  0.27  0.653  315
IT  0.63  0.177  0.25  0.056  0.029  0.018  0.04  0.106  521
JP  0.83  0.143  0.28  0.040  0.005  0.009  -0.06  0.086  1263
KR  0.39  0.205  0.27  0.089  0.027  0.018  -0.75  0.558  136
MX  0.76  0.137  0.14  0.056  0.033  0.020  0.06  0.236  187
MY  0.86  0.284  0.19  0.072  0.028  0.020 '  -0.30  0.233  450
NL  0.50  0.119  0.29  0.066  0.017  0.009  -0.03  0.152  589
NO  0.65  0.114  0.24  0.094  -0.003  0.009  0.11  0.227  262
NZ  0.32  0.255  0.15  0.095  0.021  0.026  -0.10  0.226  117
PE  0.49  0.128  0.49  0.108  0.071  0.043  -0.05  0.414  25
PH  0.60  0.271  0.39  0.087  0.040  0.032  0.48  0.428  65
PK  0.34  0.268  0.23  0.086  0.020  0.025  0.87  0.928  103
PT  -0.15  0.180  0.05  0.072  0.062  0.041  0.75  0.367  48
SE  0.81  0.152..  0.23  0.058  0.024  0.013  0.31  0.162  473
SG  0.90  0.214  0.18  0.079  0.018  0.012 a  -0.36  0.324  229
TH  0.18  0.184  0.14  0.085  0.013  0.014  0.22  0.229  236
TR  0.19  0.141  0.40  0.224  0.045  0.015  0.06  0.597  17
TW  0.60  0.255  0.05  0.181  0.100  0.045  0.39  0.535  69
Us  0.55  0.114  0.28  0.036  0.030  0.007  0.25  0.069  3942
VE  0.34  0.189  0.60  0.099 am  0.081  0.021  0.22  0.537  22
ZA  0.48  0.123  0.26  0.065  0.007  0.005  0.01  0.104  516
Mean  0.53  0.19  0.22  0.08  0.027  0.02  0.17  0.30  552
Quartiles:
25%  0.36  0.13  0.15  0.05  0.013  0.01  -0.01  0.13  114
50%  0.53  0.18  0.21  0.07  0.027  0.02  0.11  0.23  233
75%  0.73  0.25  0.27  0.09  0.040  0.03  0.35  0.42  484Figure 1. Cash Coefficients and Financial Development
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Regression  line: -0.18, significant at 1%  (the standard error is 0.05 and R squared is 0.35)
Without  KR:  -0.16,  significant  at  1%  (the  standard  error  is 0.04  and  R squared  is 0.37)Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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